llms.txt
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− > Chainsaw is an install-path firewall across 16 package ecosystems.− **Package ecosystems (16).** npm, pip/PyPI, Maven, Cargo, Composer, RubyGems,− APT, Yum, DNF. Separately, 20 repository *formats* are served — the extra four− are Gradle and Bun/Yarn (wire protocols that evaluate as the maven and npm− ecosystems) plus raw. Ecosystems are policy domains; formats are protocols.− Quote the ecosystem list when asked what Chainsaw covers.− - [2026 attacks tested against Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/attack-coverage-2026/) — 58 public 2026 supply-chain attacks tested against production v0.22.118 on 19 October 2026: outcome per attack, misses included, and the method− A baseline of 4 fires across all 16 proxied ecosystems (CVE/CVSS/EPSS, license,+ > Chainsaw is an install-path firewall across 17 package ecosystems.+ **Package ecosystems (17).** npm, pip/PyPI, Maven, Cargo, Composer, RubyGems,+ APT, Yum, DNF, Homebrew. Separately, 21 repository *formats* are served — the+ extra four are Gradle and Bun/Yarn (wire protocols that evaluate as the maven+ and npm ecosystems) plus raw. Ecosystems are policy domains; formats are+ protocols. Quote the ecosystem list when asked what Chainsaw covers.+ **Homebrew scope.** The proxy enforces Homebrew bottle downloads (ghcr.io)+ only: it refuses a bottle digest no homebrew-core formula declares, and+ applies policy to the formula and version. Homebrew's signed API is passed+ through unchanged. Source builds, casks and third-party taps never reach the+ proxy; they are covered on the device by a `brew.env` deny-list generated+ from org policy (delivered by MDM), the `brew` guard shim, and installed-+ inventory upload with CVE alerts. Formula signals: CVEs from Homebrew's own+ advisory feed (with CVSS, EPSS, KEV), licence, deprecated/disabled, bottle+ checksum binding, bottle attestations, cooldown and install analytics. There+ is no Homebrew malware feed, no maintainer/takeover or typosquat signal, and+ no CVE data for casks.+ - [DepGate vs Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/vs-depgate/) — an MIT-licensed self-hosted dependency gateway, and where the two differ+ - [Endor Labs vs Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/vs-endor-labs/) — Endor Labs Package Firewall inside an AppSec platform, and where the two differ+ - [Aikido Safe Chain vs Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/vs-aikido-safe-chain/) — Aikido's free npm and PyPI install guard, and where the two differ+ - [SafeDep PMG vs Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/vs-safedep-pmg/) — SafeDep's free package-manager guard with an install sandbox, and where the two differ+ - [Bytesafe vs Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/vs-bytesafe/) — Bytesafe's EU-hosted dependency firewall, and where the two differ+ - [Editorial policy](https://chain305.com/editorial-policy/) — who writes chain305.com, how vendor claims on comparison pages are checked and dated, how attack results are tested, and how corrections are made+ - [Install script attacks](https://chain305.com/learn/install-script-attacks/) — where npm, PyPI, Cargo and Composer run code at install time, the 2026 attacks that used each hook, and what the settings miss+ - [Maintainer account takeover](https://chain305.com/learn/maintainer-account-takeover/) — hijacked accounts, stolen tokens and trusted publishing in 2026, provenance limits, release holds and publisher-change signals+ - [Shai-Hulud](https://chain305.com/shai-hulud/) — every wave of the npm worm from 2025 to 2026, how to check whether you were hit, what to rotate first, and what Chainsaw did and did not stop+ - [Teardown: The pgserve npm compromise](https://chain305.com/teardowns/pgserve-canistersprawl-npm/) — A postinstall stealer that republished itself with the victim's stolen npm tokens+ - [Teardown: The @velora-dex/sdk npm compromise](https://chain305.com/teardowns/velora-dex-sdk-npm-compromise/) — Three prepended lines that installed a macOS backdoor on import+ - [Teardown: The Microsoft durabletask PyPI compromise](https://chain305.com/teardowns/durabletask-pypi-compromise/) — A stolen PyPI token and a dropper that ran on import+ - [Teardown: The laravel-lang tag rewrite](https://chain305.com/teardowns/laravel-lang-tag-rewrite/) — Every existing Composer tag re-pointed at a credential stealer+ - [Teardown: The onering crates.io compromise](https://chain305.com/teardowns/onering-crates-build-script/) — A build.rs that sent each build's latest commit and diff out+ - [2026 attacks tested against Chainsaw](https://chain305.com/attack-coverage-2026/) — 58 public 2026 supply-chain attacks tested against production v0.22.127 on 25 October 2026: outcome per attack, misses included, and the method+ A baseline of 4 fires across all 17 proxied ecosystems (CVE/CVSS/EPSS, license,+ - [editorial policy](https://chain305.com/editorial-policy.md)+ - [learn / install script attacks](https://chain305.com/learn/install-script-attacks.md)+ - [learn / maintainer account takeover](https://chain305.com/learn/maintainer-account-takeover.md)+ - [shai hulud](https://chain305.com/shai-hulud.md)+ - [teardowns / durabletask pypi compromise](https://chain305.com/teardowns/durabletask-pypi-compromise.md)+ - [teardowns / laravel lang tag rewrite](https://chain305.com/teardowns/laravel-lang-tag-rewrite.md)+ - [teardowns / onering crates build script](https://chain305.com/teardowns/onering-crates-build-script.md)