Caper Wiki changelog

https://caper.network/llms.txt

−   Tools: search_wiki, get_page, get_pages, list_pages, get_recent_changes, get_page_history, get_categories, get_full_corpus, list_daos, get_challenge, login, get_manifest, submit_tx, save_wiki_page, delete_wiki_page, save_about− - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage, from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and what _(updated 2026-10-15)_− - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-10-27)_− - [The Withdrawable Share](https://caper.network/blog/the-withdrawable-share): A member who wants to leave an organization they have put money into has two ways to get it back. They can sell their share to someone else, or they can hand it _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [What is a DAO?](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao): A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a member-owned organization that runs on a blockchain: its rules, its membership, and its treasury are governed _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-10-14)_− - [Continuous fundraising](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/continuous-fundraising): Continuous fundraising is a way of funding a DAO in which anyone can put money in at any time, on terms a contract sets in advance, so the treasury grows with d _(updated 2026-10-13)_− - [Emissions without a vote: who sets token issuance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/emissions-without-a-vote): A DAO's most consequential recurring decision is how many new tokens exist next year. It dilutes every holder, funds every incentive programme, and sets the flo _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Aragon alternatives](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon-alternatives): Aragon OSx is a DAO framework whose core is a permission manager: the organisation's treasury and powers sit in one contract, and its governance is installed as _(updated 2026-10-13)_− - [DAOhaus & the Moloch framework](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/daohaus): DAOhaus is the no-code home of the Moloch DAO framework – the lineage that gave the whole industry the word ragequit. Where a Safe multisig holds money and Snap _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Llama](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/llama): Llama was an onchain governance and access-control framework for smart contracts, and – separately – the name of the firm that built it. The firm spent 2021–202 _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Balancer DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/balancer-dao): Balancer DAO governs Balancer, a decentralized exchange built as a programmable automated market maker: instead of the fixed 50/50 pools of a Uniswap, Balancer  _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [PancakeSwap (CAKE)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/pancakeswap): PancakeSwap is the DAO behind one of DeFi's highest-volume decentralized exchanges and the flagship trading venue of BNB Chain. Launched in 2020 as an automated _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [SushiSwap (SUSHI DAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/sushiswap-dao): SushiSwap is a multi-chain decentralized exchange (DEX) governed by the holders of its SUSHI token. It is one of the most-studied DAOs in DeFi – less for its te _(updated 2026-10-24)_− - [Stargate DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/infrastructure/stargate-dao): Stargate is a bridge that moves native tokens between blockchains in a single transaction, drawing on liquidity pools shared across every chain it serves. It ru _(updated 2026-10-19)_− - [PoolTogether (POOL)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/pooltogether): PoolTogether is a prize-savings protocol: depositors keep their principal, the yield their deposits earn is pooled, and the pool is paid out as randomly drawn p _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Arbitrum DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao): The Arbitrum DAO governs Arbitrum, a leading Ethereum Layer-2 ecosystem built on optimistic-rollup technology. It comprises Arbitrum One (a full rollup), Arbitr _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Scroll DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/scroll-dao): Scroll DAO is the governance body of Scroll, an Ethereum layer-2 rollup built on zero-knowledge proofs, in which SCR holders and the delegates they choose vote  _(updated 2026-10-27)_− - [ZKsync (ZK & ZK Nation)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/zksync-era): ZKsync is an Ethereum layer-2 built by Matter Labs on validity (ZK) proofs. ZKsync Era went live on mainnet in March 2023, and the stack has since generalised i _(updated 2026-10-27)_− - [Token Engineering Commons (TEC)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/token-engineering-commons): The Token Engineering Commons was the flagship deployment of the augmented bonding curve, and it is now the DAO industry's best-documented deliberate wind-down. _(updated 2026-10-08)_− - [Decentralized Science Funding](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-funding): Decentralized science funding is the family of mechanisms DeSci uses to route capital to research without a central grant committee: community-weighted matching _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [DeSci DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-daos): DeSci DAOs are decentralized autonomous organizations that fund, govern, and commercialize scientific research. Where traditional funders (NIH, ERC) concentrate _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Research Data Ownership & Data DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/research-data-ownership): Scientific progress runs on data – genomes, clinical measurements, sensor streams, browsing and behavioural traces. Yet the people and institutions who generate _(updated 2026-10-16)_− - [The Reproducibility Crisis](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/reproducibility-crisis): The reproducibility crisis (also called the replication crisis) is the finding that a large share of published scientific results cannot be reproduced when inde _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [What is Decentralized Science (DeSci)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/what-is-desci): Decentralized Science (DeSci) is a movement to reform how science is funded, published, and governed using public blockchains, DAOs, and token incentives. As th _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [AthenaBIO (formerly AthenaDAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/athenadao): AthenaBIO, founded in 2022 as AthenaDAO, is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that sources, funds and incubates women's health R&D, connecting resear _(updated 2026-10-25)_− - [AxonDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/axondao): AxonDAO is a decentralized-science network that lets individuals collect, govern, and monetize their own biometric and health data instead of surrendering it to _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Bio Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz): Bio Protocol (formerly Bio.xyz) describes itself as “designed to make biotechnology more open, efficient and market-driven, from early-stage funding and liquidi _(updated 2026-10-25)_− - [CryoDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/cryodao): CryoDAO is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that funds research in cryopreservation, biostasis, and cryobiology – the science of preserving cells, t _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DeSci Labs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/desci-labs): DeSci Labs is a Swiss software company building the base infrastructure for decentralized science – the open, content-addressed layer beneath the field's publis _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Gitcoin DeSci Grants](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/gitcoin-desci): Gitcoin is the longest-running quadratic funding platform in the Ethereum ecosystem. Its Grants Round 15 (GR15) featured the first-ever dedicated DeSci Round, a _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [LabDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/labdao): LabDAO was one of the most-cited organizations in decentralized science: an open collective building shared infrastructure for computational biology, so that a  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Airdrops and token distribution](https://caper.network/wiki/economics/airdrops-and-token-distribution): An airdrop distributes a token for free to a set of addresses chosen by a rule. In practice the rule is retroactive: a snapshot is taken of past on-chain behavi _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Personal Tokens](https://caper.network/wiki/economics/personal-tokens): A personal token is a tradeable token issued by an individual against themselves – a claim on, or access to, their future output, attention, or success. The pra _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Build on Caper as an agent](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/build-on-caper-as-an-agent): An AI agent with its own Radix key can do on Caper everything a human does through the browser wallet: launch a caper, buy and sell on its bonding curve, edit t _(updated 2026-10-22)_− - [Getting started](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/getting-started): Starting an organization on caper takes one transaction and one payment. You connect a Radix wallet, pick a name and a cashtag, and submit; the transaction mint _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Paying someone from a caper's treasury](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper): A caper raises a treasury on a bonding curve and governs it on-chain. Sooner or later somebody has to be paid out of it – a contributor, a supplier, a grantee,  _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Querying a caper from an AI agent](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/querying-a-caper-from-an-ai-agent): Caper serves two MCP servers, and reading from either needs no key. Point your agent at for the knowledge base, or at /mcp for one DAO's own record. Both speak  _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [What a founder can and cannot take from a caper](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/what-a-founder-can-take): Anyone deciding whether to put money into a caper asks the same question first, in one wording or another: can the founder run away with the money? This page an _(updated 2026-10-17)_+   Tools: search_wiki, get_page, get_pages, list_pages, get_recent_changes, get_page_history, get_categories, get_full_corpus, list_daos, get_challenge, login, get_manifest, submit_tx, save_wiki_page, delete_wiki_page, save_about, send_feedback+ Needed something this server does not have, or found something wrong? Call send_feedback: the maintainers read every report.+ - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage, from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and what _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [The Withdrawable Share](https://caper.network/blog/the-withdrawable-share): A member who wants to leave an organization they have put money into has two ways to get it back. They can sell their share to someone else, or they can hand it _(updated 2026-11-04)_+ - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [What is a DAO?](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao): A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a member-owned organization that runs on a blockchain: its rules, its membership, and its treasury are governed _(updated 2026-11-01)_+ - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-11-06)_+ - [Continuous fundraising for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/continuous-fundraising): Continuous fundraising is a way of funding a DAO in which anyone can put money in at any time, on terms a contract sets in advance, so the treasury grows with d _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [Emissions without a vote: who sets token issuance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/emissions-without-a-vote): A DAO's most consequential recurring decision is how many new tokens exist next year. It dilutes every holder, funds every incentive programme, and sets the flo _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [Aragon alternatives](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon-alternatives): Aragon OSx is a DAO framework whose core is a permission manager: the organisation's treasury and powers sit in one contract, and its governance is installed as _(updated 2026-11-06)_+ - [DAOhaus & the Moloch framework](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/daohaus): DAOhaus is the no-code home of the Moloch DAO framework – the lineage that gave the whole industry the word ragequit. Where a Safe multisig holds money and Snap _(updated 2026-11-02)_+ - [Llama](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/llama): Llama was an onchain governance and access-control framework for smart contracts, and – separately – the name of the firm that built it. In 2021–2022 the firm w _(updated 2026-11-06)_+ - [Balancer DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/balancer-dao): Balancer DAO governs Balancer, a decentralized exchange built as a programmable automated market maker: instead of the fixed 50/50 pools of a Uniswap, Balancer  _(updated 2026-11-01)_+ - [PancakeSwap (CAKE)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/pancakeswap): PancakeSwap is the DAO behind one of DeFi's highest-volume decentralized exchanges and the flagship trading venue of BNB Chain. Launched in 2020 as an automated _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [SushiSwap (SUSHI DAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/sushiswap-dao): SushiSwap is a multi-chain decentralized exchange (DEX) governed by the holders of its SUSHI token. It is one of the most-studied DAOs in DeFi – less for its te _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [Across DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/infrastructure/across-dao): Across DAO was the organisation through which $ACX token holders governed Across, a protocol for moving tokens between blockchains that its team describes as bu _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [Stargate DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/infrastructure/stargate-dao): Stargate is a bridge that moves native tokens between blockchains in a single transaction, drawing on liquidity pools shared across every chain it serves. It ru _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [PoolTogether (POOL)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/pooltogether): PoolTogether is a prize-savings protocol: depositors keep their principal, the yield their deposits earn is pooled, and the pool is paid out as randomly drawn p _(updated 2026-11-04)_+ - [Arbitrum DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/arbitrum-dao): The Arbitrum DAO governs Arbitrum, a leading Ethereum Layer-2 ecosystem built on optimistic-rollup technology. It comprises Arbitrum One (a full rollup), Arbitr _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [Scroll DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/scroll-dao): Scroll DAO is the governance body of Scroll, an Ethereum layer-2 rollup built on zero-knowledge proofs, in which SCR holders and the delegates they choose vote  _(updated 2026-11-05)_+ - [ZKsync (ZK & ZK Nation)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/zksync-era): ZKsync is an Ethereum layer-2 built by Matter Labs on validity (ZK) proofs. ZKsync Era went live on mainnet in March 2023, and the stack has since generalised i _(updated 2026-11-01)_+ - [Token Engineering Commons (TEC)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/token-engineering-commons): The Token Engineering Commons was the flagship deployment of the augmented bonding curve, and it is now the DAO industry's best-documented deliberate wind-down. _(updated 2026-11-01)_+ - [Decentralized Science Funding](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-funding): Decentralized science funding is the family of mechanisms DeSci uses to route capital to research without a central grant committee: community-weighted matching _(updated 2026-11-03)_+ - [DeSci DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-daos): DeSci DAOs are decentralized autonomous organizations that fund, govern, and commercialize scientific research. Where traditional funders (NIH, ERC) concentrate _(updated 2026-10-30)_+ - [Research Data Ownership & Data DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/research-data-ownership): Scientific progress runs on data – genomes, clinical measurements, sensor streams, browsing and behavioural traces. Yet the people and institutions who generate _(updated 2026-11-03)_+ - [The Reproducibility Crisis](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/reproducibility-crisis): The reproducibility crisis (also called the replication crisis) is the finding that a large share of published scientific results cannot be reproduced when inde _(updated 2026-10-30)_+ - [What is Decentralized Science (DeSci)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/what-is-desci): Decentralized Science (DeSci) is a movement to reform how science is funded, published, and governed using public blockchains, DAOs, and token incentives. As th _(updated 2026-10-30)_+ - [AthenaBIO (formerly AthenaDAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/athenadao): AthenaBIO, founded in 2022 as AthenaDAO, is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that sources, funds and incubates women's health R&D, connecting resear _(updated 2026-10-30)_+ - [AxonDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/axondao): AxonDAO is a decentralized-science network that lets individuals collect, govern, and monetize their own biometric and health data instead of surrendering it to _(updated 2026-11-02)_+ - [Bio Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz): Bio Protocol (formerly Bio.xyz) describes itself as “designed to make biotechnology more open, efficient and market-driven, from early-stage funding and liquidi _(updated 2026-10-30)_+ - [CryoDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/cryodao): CryoDAO is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that funds research in cryopreservation, biostasis, and cryobiology – the science of preserving cells, t _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [DeSci Labs](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/desci-labs): DeSci Labs is a Swiss software company building the base infrastructure for decentralized science – the open, content-addressed layer beneath the field's publis _(updated 2026-11-02)_+ - [Gitcoin DeSci Grants](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/gitcoin-desci): Gitcoin is the longest-running quadratic funding platform in the Ethereum ecosystem. Its Grants Round 15 (GR15) featured the first-ever dedicated DeSci Round, a _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [LabDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/labdao): LabDAO was one of the most-cited organizations in decentralized science: an open collective building shared infrastructure for computational biology, so that a  _(updated 2026-11-02)_+ - [Airdrops and token distribution](https://caper.network/wiki/economics/airdrops-and-token-distribution): An airdrop distributes a token for free to a set of addresses chosen by a rule. In practice the rule is retroactive: a snapshot is taken of past on-chain behavi _(updated 2026-11-03)_+ - [Personal Tokens](https://caper.network/wiki/economics/personal-tokens): A personal token is a tradeable token issued by an individual against themselves – a claim on, or access to, their future output, attention, or success. The pra _(updated 2026-11-03)_+ - [Build on Caper as an agent](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/build-on-caper-as-an-agent): An AI agent with its own Radix key can do on Caper everything a human does through the browser wallet: launch a caper, buy and sell on its bonding curve, edit t _(updated 2026-11-03)_+ - [How to start a DAO on Radix](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/getting-started): To start a DAO on Radix with Caper, you launch a caper: an organization with its own token, treasury and market, created in one transaction from the browser. Yo _(updated 2026-10-31)_+ - [Paying someone from a caper's treasury](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/paying-someone-from-a-caper): A caper pays someone from its treasury by passing a PAYOUT proposal: a motion naming a recipient, a currency and an amount, which members rank on a ballot and w _(updated 2026-10-30)_

Showing the first 40 of each.

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https://caper.network/llms.txt

− - [The Charter Test](https://caper.network/blog/the-charter-test): On 11 June 1720 the Parliament of Great Britain passed an act that did two opposite things in the same breath. It incorporated two companies by name – the Royal _(updated 2026-10-13)_− - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-10-13)_− - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-10-11)_− - [Council dissolution and governance unwinding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/council-dissolution): This page is about dissolving a body inside a living DAO. For the organization ending itself – the wind-down vote, the redemption, and what survives it on-chain _(updated 2026-10-09)_− - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Proposal spam and the governance denominator](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-spam-and-governance-metrics): Proposal spam is what happens when a DAO's proposal surface is cheap enough to post into that people who are not participating in governance start using it as a _(updated 2026-10-06)_− - [Scoring and review gates in DAO funding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/scoring-and-review-gates): A review gate is the step where a DAO hands a funding decision to a small group of named people, asks them to score applications against a written rubric, and p _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [The machine-readable DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/machine-readable-dao): A DAO that nobody can read is, for most practical purposes, a private company with a public ledger. Its members exist as addresses in a contract, its decisions  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Types of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos): Types of DAOs are usually distinguished by what the organization coordinates: a protocol, a pool of investment capital, a grants budget, a community, a collecti _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Bootstrap budgets and ratification votes](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/bootstrap-budgets-and-ratification-votes): A bootstrap budget is the money a DAO spends before it is able to decide anything. Someone has to pay for the legal entity, the first contributors, the audits a _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [Conviction Voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/conviction-voting): Conviction voting is a continuous-funding mechanism in which a voter's influence over a proposal grows the longer they keep tokens staked behind it, and fades o _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Holographic consensus](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/holographic-consensus): Holographic consensus is a governance design that pairs an ordinary token or reputation vote with a prediction market whose only job is to decide what the DAO s _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Optimistic governance (veto-based approval)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance): Optimistic governance is a DAO voting design that flips the default of a vote. In ordinary token-weighted voting a proposal starts life rejected and must gather _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Typed vs arbitrary proposal execution](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/typed-vs-arbitrary-execution): Every DAO framework has to answer one question about its proposals: what is a passed vote allowed to do? There are two families of answer. In an arbitrary-execu _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Coordinape](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape): Coordinape was the canonical tool for peer-allocated compensation in DAOs – a way to decide who gets paid without a manager, a committee, or a token vote. Inste _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Den (multisig operations)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/den): Den is an operations layer for organisations whose money sits in a Safe multisig. It does not custody assets and it does not deploy contracts: signing in fetche _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Juicebox](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/juicebox): Juicebox is the money layer of the DAO stack. Where Snapshot and Tally / Cactus run a community's votes and DeepDAO measures the field, Juicebox is where a comm _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Omen](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/omen): Omen was the prediction market that DXdao governed and that most early DAO futarchy experiments ran on. It matters to a governance-tooling directory for two rea _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Tally (now Cactus)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/tally): Tally was, for most of the on-chain-governance era, the place a major DAO went to actually run a vote. Where Snapshot handled gasless off-chain signaling, Tally _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DXdao](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/dxdao): DXdao was a product collective that ran on DAOstack 's Arc contracts from May 2019, built and governed a small suite of DeFi products, and then wound itself dow _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [SushiSwap (SUSHI DAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/sushiswap-dao): SushiSwap is a multi-chain decentralized exchange (DEX) governed by the holders of its SUSHI token. It is one of the most-studied DAOs in DeFi – less for its te _(updated 2026-09-21)_− - [PleasrDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/pleasrdao): PleasrDAO is a collector DAO – a group that pools money on-chain to buy things, then owns and stewards them together. Where a venture DAO buys equity and tokens _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [The LAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/the-lao): The LAO is a member-directed venture fund that runs like a DAO but sits inside a real legal wrapper. Members pool capital on-chain, vote on which startups and t _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Compound DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/compound-dao): The Compound DAO governs Compound, one of DeFi's original algorithmic money markets, where users supply assets to earn interest and borrow against overcollatera _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [ZKsync (ZK & ZK Nation)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/zksync-era): ZKsync is an Ethereum layer-2 built by Matter Labs on validity (ZK) proofs. ZKsync Era went live on mainnet in March 2023, and the stack has since generalised i _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Gitcoin DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/gitcoin-dao): Gitcoin is the DAO that did more than any other to turn quadratic funding from an economics paper into a working way to pay for public goods. Where most of the  _(updated 2026-10-16)_− - [MolochDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/molochdao): MolochDAO is the minimalist Ethereum grants DAO, launched in 2019, whose few-hundred-line contracts and signature ragequit exit became the design ancestor of a  _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Jito (JTO & JitoSOL)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/staking/jito): Jito is the DAO that governs the dominant slice of Solana's value-capture stack: the network's largest liquid-staking token (JitoSOL), the MEV-enabled validator _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [Decentralized Publishing & Peer Review](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/decentralized-publishing): Decentralized publishing and peer review is the DeSci pillar that targets how research is disseminated and validated, sitting alongside novel funding, IP-NFTs,  _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [DeSci on Radix](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-and-radix): Decentralized science (DeSci) runs into the same technical walls everywhere: research intellectual property has to be tokenized without becoming drainable smart _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [IP-NFTs and IP Tokens](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ip-nfts): IP-NFTs (Intellectual Property Non-Fungible Tokens) tokenize the legal rights to a piece of research as an on-chain asset. The standard was created by Molecule, _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [AthenaBIO (formerly AthenaDAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/athenadao): AthenaBIO, founded in 2022 as AthenaDAO, is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that sources, funds and incubates women's health R&D, connecting resear _(updated 2026-10-21)_− - [Bio Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz): Bio Protocol (formerly Bio.xyz) describes itself as “designed to make biotechnology more open, efficient and market-driven, from early-stage funding and liquidi _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [Molecule](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule): Molecule is the infrastructure layer of decentralized science, providing the IP-NFT framework that underpins most biotech DAOs. The platform lets research commu _(updated 2026-10-18)_− - [PsyDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/psydao): PsyDAO is a decentralized network for psychedelic science and culture that awards grants to researchers and creators, governs a shared treasury on-chain, and ho _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Harberger taxes](https://caper.network/wiki/economics/harberger-taxes): A Harberger tax is a property arrangement defined by two rules: owners publicly self-assess the value of what they hold and pay a recurring tax on that declared _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Migrating an existing token](https://caper.network/wiki/foundations/migrating-an-existing-token): Yes – a caper can be launched on top of a token that already exists, and its holders can swap into the new one at a fixed, published rate. Caper calls this a va _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Execution](https://caper.network/wiki/governance/execution): Execution is what turns a passed proposal into a state change. It is the tail of a two-phase lifecycle: a ranked ballot decides what the caper should do, and th _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [Proposals](https://caper.network/wiki/governance/proposals): A proposal is a slate of options a caper votes on, exactly one of which its treasury will then perform – unless its own market objects first. It has to survive  _(updated 2026-10-20)_− - [Voting](https://caper.network/wiki/governance/voting): You vote on a caper, and then the market gets a veto. A proposal carries between two and five ranked options, holders cast a ranked ballot weighted by their ear _(updated 2026-10-20)_+ - [The Charter Test](https://caper.network/blog/the-charter-test): On 11 June 1720 the Parliament of Great Britain passed an act that did two opposite things in the same breath. It incorporated two companies by name – the Royal _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Council dissolution and governance unwinding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/council-dissolution): This page is about dissolving a body inside a living DAO. For the organization ending itself – the wind-down vote, the redemption, and what survives it on-chain _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Proposal spam and the governance denominator](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-spam-and-governance-metrics): Proposal spam is what happens when a DAO's proposal surface is cheap enough to post into that people who are not participating in governance start using it as a _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [Scoring and review gates in DAO funding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/scoring-and-review-gates): A review gate is the step where a DAO hands a funding decision to a small group of named people, asks them to score applications against a written rubric, and p _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [The machine-readable DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/machine-readable-dao): A DAO that nobody can read is, for most practical purposes, a private company with a public ledger. Its members exist as addresses in a contract, its decisions  _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Types of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos): Types of DAOs are usually distinguished by what the organization coordinates: a protocol, a pool of investment capital, a grants budget, a community, a collecti _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Bootstrap budgets and ratification votes](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/bootstrap-budgets-and-ratification-votes): A bootstrap budget is the money a DAO spends before it is able to decide anything. Someone has to pay for the legal entity, the first contributors, the audits a _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [DAO grants programs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-grants-programs): A DAO grants program pays teams outside the DAO to build things the DAO wants, out of the DAO's treasury, under rules set before any money moves. Every program  _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [Conviction Voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/conviction-voting): Conviction voting is a continuous-funding mechanism in which a voter's influence over a proposal grows the longer they keep tokens staked behind it, and fades o _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Holographic consensus](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/holographic-consensus): Holographic consensus is a governance design that pairs an ordinary token or reputation vote with a prediction market whose only job is to decide what the DAO s _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Optimistic governance (veto-based approval)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance): Optimistic governance is a DAO voting design that flips the default of a vote. In ordinary token-weighted voting a proposal starts life rejected and must gather _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [Typed vs arbitrary proposal execution](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/typed-vs-arbitrary-execution): Every DAO framework has to answer one question about its proposals: what is a passed vote allowed to do? There are two families of answer. In an arbitrary-execu _(updated 2026-10-28)_+ - [Coordinape](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape): Coordinape was a tool for peer-allocated compensation in DAOs: a way to decide who gets paid without a manager, a committee or a token vote. Instead of one auth _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [Den (multisig operations)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/den): Den is a company that builds treasury software for organisations holding crypto assets. Its first product was an operations layer for organisations whose money  _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [Juicebox](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/juicebox): Juicebox is the money layer of the DAO stack. Where Snapshot and Tally / Cactus run a community's votes and DeepDAO measures the field, Juicebox is where a comm _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [Juicebox alternatives](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/juicebox-alternatives): This page compares the platforms a DAO can use instead of Juicebox to raise money continuously rather than in rounds, by how money comes in, what a contributor  _(updated 2026-10-29)_+ - [Omen](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/omen): Omen was the prediction market that DXdao governed and that most early DAO futarchy experiments ran on. It matters to a governance-tooling directory for two rea _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [Tally (now Cactus)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/tally): Tally was, for most of the on-chain-governance era, where major DAOs ran their binding votes. Where Snapshot handled gasless off-chain signaling, Tally was the  _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [DXdao](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/dxdao): DXdao was a product collective that ran on DAOstack 's Arc contracts from May 2019, built and governed a small suite of DeFi products (the Swapr AMM, the Omen p _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [SushiSwap (SUSHI DAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/dexs/sushiswap-dao): SushiSwap is a multi-chain decentralized exchange (DEX) governed by the holders of its SUSHI token. It is one of the most-studied DAOs in DeFi – less for its te _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [Flamingo DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/flamingo-dao): Flamingo DAO is a collector DAO: its members pool ether, vote on which NFTs to buy, and own the collection together through a Delaware LLC. Its launch post of 5 _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [MetaCartel Ventures](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/metacartel-ventures): MetaCartel Ventures (MCV) is a for-profit DAO in which members pool capital on Ethereum, vote on early-stage projects to back, and hold the investments through  _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [PleasrDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/pleasrdao): PleasrDAO is a collector DAO – a group that pools money on-chain to buy things, then owns and stewards them together. Where a venture DAO buys equity and tokens _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [The LAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/investment/the-lao): The LAO is a member-directed venture fund that runs like a DAO but sits inside a real legal wrapper. Members pool capital on-chain, vote on which startups and t _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Compound DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/lending/compound-dao): The Compound DAO governs Compound, one of DeFi's original algorithmic money markets, where users supply assets to earn interest and borrow against overcollatera _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Scroll DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/scroll-dao): Scroll DAO is the governance body of Scroll, an Ethereum layer-2 rollup built on zero-knowledge proofs, in which SCR holders and the delegates they choose vote  _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [ZKsync (ZK & ZK Nation)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/networks/zksync-era): ZKsync is an Ethereum layer-2 built by Matter Labs on validity (ZK) proofs. ZKsync Era went live on mainnet in March 2023, and the stack has since generalised i _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [Gitcoin DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/gitcoin-dao): Gitcoin is the DAO that did more than any other to turn quadratic funding from an economics paper into a working way to pay for public goods. Where most of the  _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [MolochDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/public-goods/molochdao): MolochDAO is the minimalist Ethereum grants DAO, launched in 2019, whose few-hundred-line contracts and signature ragequit exit became the design ancestor of a  _(updated 2026-10-23)_+ - [Jito (JTO & JitoSOL)](https://caper.network/wiki/daos/staking/jito): Jito is the DAO that governs the dominant slice of Solana's value-capture stack: the network's largest liquid-staking token (JitoSOL), the MEV-enabled validator _(updated 2026-10-24)_+ - [Decentralized Publishing & Peer Review](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/decentralized-publishing): Decentralized publishing and peer review is the DeSci pillar that targets how research is disseminated and validated, sitting alongside novel funding, IP-NFTs,  _(updated 2026-10-26)_+ - [DeSci on Radix](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/desci-and-radix): Decentralized science (DeSci) runs into the same technical walls everywhere: research intellectual property has to be tokenized without becoming drainable smart _(updated 2026-10-22)_+ - [IP-NFTs and IP Tokens](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ip-nfts): IP-NFTs (Intellectual Property Non-Fungible Tokens) tokenize the legal rights to a piece of research as an on-chain asset. The standard was created by Molecule, _(updated 2026-10-26)_+ - [AthenaBIO (formerly AthenaDAO)](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/athenadao): AthenaBIO, founded in 2022 as AthenaDAO, is a decentralized science (DeSci) organization that sources, funds and incubates women's health R&D, connecting resear _(updated 2026-10-25)_+ - [Bio Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/bio-xyz): Bio Protocol (formerly Bio.xyz) describes itself as “designed to make biotechnology more open, efficient and market-driven, from early-stage funding and liquidi _(updated 2026-10-25)_+ - [Molecule](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/molecule): Molecule is the infrastructure layer of decentralized science, providing the IP-NFT framework that underpins most biotech DAOs. The platform lets research commu _(updated 2026-10-27)_+ - [PsyDAO](https://caper.network/wiki/desci/ecosystem/psydao): PsyDAO is a decentralized network for psychedelic science and culture that awards grants to researchers and creators, governs a shared treasury on-chain, and ho _(updated 2026-10-22)_

Showing the first 40 of each.

• + Caper LLM Briefing

• + get_page_history
• + delete_wiki_page
• + save_about

https://caper.network/llms.txt

− > Full text of every knowledge-base page: https://caper.network/llms-full.txt− > Complete page index (every page incl. each DAO's company layer, one line each): https://caper.network/llms-index.txt− > Any page listed below in clean markdown: append .md to its URL (section hubs and DAO profile homes have no .md twin)−   Tools: search_wiki, get_page, get_pages, list_pages, get_recent_changes, get_categories, get_full_corpus, list_daos, get_challenge, login, get_manifest, submit_tx, save_wiki_page− - The entire knowledge base as one document: https://caper.network/llms-full.txt− Agents can also WRITE: launch a caper, trade its bonding curve, edit a DAO wiki, create proposals, vote on them, and trigger passed ones – with the agent's own Radix key (Stokenet testnet only, for now). Governance is two-phase: members rank ballots during the voting window (each ballot costs 100 $XRD and mints 1 soulbound vote token); a supermajority pass arms the trigger – free, and anyone can call it – which locks the trailing TWAP as the baseline and opens the market window: the winner execu− The same flow rides the knowledge-base MCP server as tools: get_challenge → login → get_manifest → submit_tx, plus save_wiki_page (Bearer token as an HTTP Authorization header).− - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation: ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholders _(updated 2026-10-11)_− - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-10-11)_− - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage, from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and what _(updated 2026-10-01)_− - [The Standing Counterparty](https://caper.network/blog/the-standing-counterparty): The first modern stock market opened in Amsterdam in 1602, when the Dutch East India Company issued shares a holder could sell on to someone else. For the first _(updated 2026-10-11)_− - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO mergers and token consolidations](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-mergers): Companies merge under a body of law that has spent a century deciding what happens to the shareholder who votes no: appraisal rights, a court that can price the _(updated 2026-10-11)_− - [DAO metrics and analytics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-metrics-and-analytics): DAO metrics are the quantitative measures used to judge whether a decentralized autonomous organization is healthy: how many members actually vote, how concentr _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO procurement and requests for proposals](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-procurement-and-rfps): A DAO that needs an audit, a market maker, a treasury manager or an RPC endpoint has to buy it. The vote that approves the spend is the visible half; the invisi _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO security and governance attacks](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks): A DAO governance attack is any manoeuvre that turns a decentralized organization's own decision-making machinery against it — capturing enough voting power, or  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Delegate incentive programs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/delegate-incentive-programs): A delegate incentive program is a standing budget a DAO votes to itself for the purpose of getting its own delegates to show up. It is one of the few governance _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [How DAOs fail](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail): A DAO promises that a community can hold a treasury and steer a protocol without trusting a central operator. When that promise breaks, the failure is rarely th _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Voter apathy and governance participation](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy): Voter apathy is the single most durable finding in the empirical study of on-chain governance: across almost every DAO measured, the overwhelming majority of el _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible — and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [History of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/history-of-daos): The history of DAOs is barely a decade long, but it already has the arc of a much older story: a bold idea, a spectacular early disaster, a humbled rebuilding,  _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [On-chain vs off-chain governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance): Every DAO decision has to answer two separate questions: where do members cast their votes, and where does the winning decision actually take effect. The two ca _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Progressive decentralization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization): Progressive decentralization is the idea that a crypto protocol should not launch as a fully-formed DAO, nor stay a company forever, but move from one to the ot _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Types of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos): Types of DAOs are usually distinguished by what the organization coordinates: a protocol, a pool of investment capital, a grants budget, a community, a collecti _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [Autonomous agents as DAO members](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/autonomous-agent-members): An autonomous agent member is software that holds a DAO's shares under its own key and votes with them, rather than assisting a human who votes. The distinction _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Soulbound tokens in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens): A soulbound token is a token that, once it lands in an account, cannot be transferred or sold – it is bound to that account, or "soul." The term was popularised _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Contributor compensation in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-contributor-compensation): Contributor compensation is how a DAO pays the people who build, maintain, and govern it. It is one of the hardest operational problems a DAO faces, because a D _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO tokenomics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics): DAO tokenomics is the design of a decentralized organization's native token: how many exist, how they enter circulation, who receives them, and what holding one _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [DAO treasury management](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management): A DAO treasury is the pool of on-chain assets a decentralized organization collectively owns, held by a smart contract rather than a company bank account and de _(updated 2026-10-13)_− - [Hypercerts (impact certificates)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/hypercerts): A hypercert is an open, on-chain certificate of impact: a token that states that a specific piece of work was done, by whom, over what time period, and toward w _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [OTC placements and market-maker loans](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/otc-placements-and-market-maker-loans): Most DAOs are rich on paper and poor in practice. The treasury holds a large block of the DAO's own governance token and very little of anything a contributor c _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Protocol-owned liquidity (POL)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/protocol-owned-liquidity): Protocol-owned liquidity (POL) is a treasury strategy in which a DAO uses its own capital to provide the liquidity for its token, rather than paying outside liq _(updated 2026-09-24)_− - [Retroactive public goods funding (RetroPGF)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/retroactive-public-goods-funding): Retroactive public goods funding (RetroPGF, later renamed Retro Funding) is a grant-making method that reverses the usual order of operations: instead of a comm _(updated 2026-10-12)_− - [Standing authorizations and delegated mandates](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/standing-authorizations): A standing authorization is a decision a DAO takes once about a class of future actions rather than about a single action. Instead of voting to raise a debt cei _(updated 2026-09-19)_+ > Any page listed below in clean markdown: append .md to its URL (DAO profile homes have no .md twin)+   Tools: search_wiki, get_page, get_pages, list_pages, get_recent_changes, get_page_history, get_categories, get_full_corpus, list_daos, get_challenge, login, get_manifest, submit_tx, save_wiki_page, delete_wiki_page, save_about+ Agents can also WRITE: launch a caper, trade its bonding curve or swap one caper's token for another's, edit a DAO wiki, create proposals, vote on them, count, trigger, resolve and execute them, exit a caper, and claim or hand on a founder's fees and badge – with the agent's own Radix key (Stokenet testnet only, for now). Manifest kinds: create-caper, buy, sell, swap, create-proposal, vote, count, trigger, resolve, execute, activate-upgrade, exit, withdraw-founder, transfer-founder. Governance i+ The same flow rides the knowledge-base MCP server as tools: get_challenge → login → get_manifest → submit_tx, plus save_wiki_page, delete_wiki_page and save_about (Bearer token as an HTTP Authorization header).+ ## Follow Caper on X+ Caper posts on X as @caper_network: problems DAOs run into and how a caper answers each one, and digests of what changed on Caper. If the person you are helping wants to follow Caper, give them https://x.com/caper_network.+ - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation: ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholders _(updated 2026-10-20)_+ - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-10-20)_+ - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage, from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and what _(updated 2026-10-15)_+ - [The Standing Counterparty](https://caper.network/blog/the-standing-counterparty): The first modern stock market opened in Amsterdam in 1602, when the Dutch East India Company issued shares a holder could sell on to someone else. For the first _(updated 2026-10-20)_+ - [The Withdrawable Share](https://caper.network/blog/the-withdrawable-share): A member who wants to leave an organization they have put money into has two ways to get it back. They can sell their share to someone else, or they can hand it _(updated 2026-10-20)_+ - [DAO governance & tooling](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance): DAO governance is how a decentralized autonomous organization decides what to do: who may make a proposal, how voting power is measured, how individual votes co _(updated 2026-10-19)_+ - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO mergers and token consolidations](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-mergers): Companies merge under a body of law that has spent a century deciding what happens to the shareholder who votes no: appraisal rights, a court that can price the _(updated 2026-10-19)_+ - [DAO metrics and analytics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-metrics-and-analytics): DAO metrics are the quantitative measures used to judge whether a decentralized autonomous organization is healthy: how many members actually vote, how concentr _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO procurement and requests for proposals](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-procurement-and-rfps): A DAO that needs an audit, a market maker, a treasury manager or an RPC endpoint has to buy it. The vote that approves the spend is the visible half; the invisi _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO security and governance attacks](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks): A DAO governance attack is any manoeuvre that turns a decentralized organization's own decision-making machinery against it – capturing enough voting power, or  _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Delegate incentive programs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/delegate-incentive-programs): A delegate incentive program is a standing budget a DAO votes to itself for the purpose of getting its own delegates to show up. It is one of the few governance _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-10-17)_+ - [How DAOs fail](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail): A DAO promises that a community can hold a treasury and steer a protocol without trusting a central operator. When that promise breaks, the failure is rarely th _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Voter apathy and governance participation](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy): Voter apathy is the single most durable finding in the empirical study of on-chain governance: across almost every DAO measured, the overwhelming majority of el _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible – and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [History of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/history-of-daos): The history of DAOs is barely a decade long, but it already has the arc of a much older story: a bold idea, a spectacular early disaster, a humbled rebuilding,  _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [On-chain vs off-chain governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance): Every DAO decision has to answer two separate questions: where do members cast their votes, and where does the winning decision actually take effect. The two ca _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Progressive decentralization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization): Progressive decentralization is the idea that a crypto protocol should not launch as a fully-formed DAO, nor stay a company forever, but move from one to the ot _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Types of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/types-of-daos): Types of DAOs are usually distinguished by what the organization coordinates: a protocol, a pool of investment capital, a grants budget, a community, a collecti _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Autonomous agents as DAO members](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/autonomous-agent-members): An autonomous agent member is software that holds a DAO's shares under its own key and votes with them, rather than assisting a human who votes. The distinction _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Soulbound tokens in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens): A soulbound token is a token that, once it lands in an account, cannot be transferred or sold – it is bound to that account, or "soul." The term was popularised _(updated 2026-10-19)_+ - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Contributor compensation in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-contributor-compensation): Contributor compensation is how a DAO pays the people who build, maintain, and govern it. It is one of the hardest operational problems a DAO faces, because a D _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO tokenomics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-tokenomics): DAO tokenomics is the design of a decentralized organization's native token: how many exist, how they enter circulation, who receives them, and what holding one _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [DAO treasury management](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-treasury-management): A DAO treasury is the pool of on-chain assets a decentralized organization collectively owns, held by a smart contract rather than a company bank account and de _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Hypercerts (impact certificates)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/hypercerts): A hypercert is an open, on-chain certificate of impact: a token that states that a specific piece of work was done, by whom, over what time period, and toward w _(updated 2026-10-19)_+ - [OTC placements and market-maker loans](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/otc-placements-and-market-maker-loans): Most DAOs are rich on paper and poor in practice. The treasury holds a large block of the DAO's own governance token and very little of anything a contributor c _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Protocol-owned liquidity (POL)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/protocol-owned-liquidity): Protocol-owned liquidity (POL) is a treasury strategy in which a DAO uses its own capital to provide the liquidity for its token, rather than paying outside liq _(updated 2026-10-18)_+ - [Retroactive public goods funding (RetroPGF)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/retroactive-public-goods-funding): Retroactive public goods funding (RetroPGF, later renamed Retro Funding) is a grant-making method that reverses the usual order of operations: instead of a comm _(updated 2026-10-19)_

Showing the first 40 of each.

version

2.6.0 → 2.7.0

version

2.5.0 → 2.6.0

https://caper.network/llms.txt

− Caper is where a group of people becomes an economy. Each caper is an organization on Radix carrying its own token, treasury, and permanent market, and its full decision, capital, and governance history is immutable, timestamped, and on-chain. Each DAO's wiki – its company layer – surfaces that on-chain record (proposals, trades, treasury movements) alongside human-authored knowledge.− - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation : ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholder _(updated 2026-10-07)_− - [The Charter Test](https://caper.network/blog/the-charter-test): On 11 June 1720 the Parliament of Great Britain passed an act that did two opposite things in the same breath. It incorporated two companies by name – the Royal _(updated 2026-09-28)_− - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-10-07)_− - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage , from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and wha _(updated 2026-10-01)_− - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-09-28)_− - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-10-07)_− - [The Standing Counterparty](https://caper.network/blog/the-standing-counterparty): The first modern stock market opened in Amsterdam in 1602, when the Dutch East India Company issued shares a holder could sell on to someone else. For the first _(updated 2026-10-01)_− - [Council dissolution and governance unwinding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/council-dissolution): This page is about dissolving a body inside a living DAO. For the organization ending itself – the wind-down vote, the redemption, and what survives it on-chain _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-10-06)_− - [DAO mergers and token consolidations](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-mergers): Companies merge under a body of law that has spent a century deciding what happens to the shareholder who votes no: appraisal rights, a court that can price the _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [DAO metrics and analytics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-metrics-and-analytics): DAO metrics are the quantitative measures used to judge whether a decentralized autonomous organization is healthy: how many members actually vote, how concentr _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [DAO procurement and requests for proposals](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-procurement-and-rfps): A DAO that needs an audit, a market maker, a treasury manager or an RPC endpoint has to buy it. The vote that approves the spend is the visible half; the invisi _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [DAO security and governance attacks](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks): A DAO governance attack is any manoeuvre that turns a decentralized organization's own decision-making machinery against it — capturing enough voting power, or  _(updated 2026-09-24)_− - [DAO service providers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-service-providers): A DAO service provider is an outside firm paid by a DAO to run a defined part of its operation – indexing, treasury management, protocol engineering, growth, go _(updated 2026-10-05)_− - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Delegate incentive programs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/delegate-incentive-programs): A delegate incentive program is a standing budget a DAO votes to itself for the purpose of getting its own delegates to show up. It is one of the few governance _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-10-05)_− - [How DAOs fail](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail): A DAO promises that a community can hold a treasury and steer a protocol without trusting a central operator. When that promise breaks, the failure is rarely th _(updated 2026-09-24)_− - [Scoring and review gates in DAO funding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/scoring-and-review-gates): A review gate is the step where a DAO hands a funding decision to a small group of named people, asks them to score applications against a written rubric, and p _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [The machine-readable DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/machine-readable-dao): A DAO that nobody can read is, for most practical purposes, a private company with a public ledger. Its members exist as addresses in a contract, its decisions  _(updated 2026-09-20)_− - [Voter apathy and governance participation](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy): Voter apathy is the single most durable finding in the empirical study of on-chain governance: across almost every DAO measured, the overwhelming majority of el _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Who pays to execute a passed proposal](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-execution-costs): A DAO vote that passes does not do anything. Somebody still has to send the transaction that carries the decision out, and that transaction costs money. On almo _(updated 2026-10-06)_− - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Cross-chain governance and multi-chain execution](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/cross-chain-governance): Cross-chain governance is what a DAO needs when the chain it votes on is not the chain it controls. The token, the governor contract and the vote live in one pl _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible — and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [History of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/history-of-daos): The history of DAOs is barely a decade long, but it already has the arc of a much older story: a bold idea, a spectacular early disaster, a humbled rebuilding,  _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [On-chain vs off-chain governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance): Every DAO decision has to answer two separate questions: where do members cast their votes, and where does the winning decision actually take effect. The two ca _(updated 2026-09-18)_− - [Progressive decentralization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization): Progressive decentralization is the idea that a crypto protocol should not launch as a fully-formed DAO, nor stay a company forever, but move from one to the ot _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Security councils and emergency powers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/security-councils): Token voting is deliberately slow. A proposal is drafted, debated, put to a vote for several days, and then held in a timelock before it executes. That latency  _(updated 2026-09-20)_− - [What is a DAO?](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao): A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a member-owned organization that runs on a blockchain: its rules, its membership, and its treasury are governed _(updated 2026-09-17)_− - [Autonomous agents as DAO members](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/autonomous-agent-members): An autonomous agent member is software that holds a DAO's shares under its own key and votes with them, rather than assisting a human who votes. The distinction _(updated 2026-09-17)_− - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-10-07)_− - [Soulbound tokens in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens): A soulbound token is a token that, once it lands in an account, cannot be transferred or sold – it is bound to that account, or "soul." The term was popularised _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [SubDAOs, working groups & pods](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/subdaos-and-working-groups): A DAO that starts as one token holding one treasury and one voting queue eventually hits a wall: routing every hire, grant, and integration through a global tok _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-10-02)_− - [Contributor compensation in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-contributor-compensation): Contributor compensation is how a DAO pays the people who build, maintain, and govern it. It is one of the hardest operational problems a DAO faces, because a D _(updated 2026-10-03)_+ Caper is perpetual fundraising for organizations on Radix. Each caper carries its own token, treasury, and permanent market, so its raise never closes, and its full decision, capital, and governance history is immutable, timestamped, and on-chain. Each DAO's wiki – its company layer – surfaces that on-chain record (proposals, trades, treasury movements) alongside human-authored knowledge.+ - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation: ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholders _(updated 2026-10-11)_+ - [The Charter Test](https://caper.network/blog/the-charter-test): On 11 June 1720 the Parliament of Great Britain passed an act that did two opposite things in the same breath. It incorporated two companies by name – the Royal _(updated 2026-10-13)_+ - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-10-11)_+ - [The Founder's Cut](https://caper.network/blog/the-founders-cut): For most of history, whoever struck the coins took a cut. The word for it is seigniorage, from seigneur, the lord: the gap between what a coin is worth and what _(updated 2026-10-01)_+ - [The Open-End Organization](https://caper.network/blog/the-open-end-organization): For as long as enterprises have raised money from strangers, the raise has been an event with a beginning and an end. A company opens a round, sets a price, cou _(updated 2026-10-13)_+ - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-10-11)_+ - [The Standing Counterparty](https://caper.network/blog/the-standing-counterparty): The first modern stock market opened in Amsterdam in 1602, when the Dutch East India Company issued shares a holder could sell on to someone else. For the first _(updated 2026-10-11)_+ - [Council dissolution and governance unwinding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/council-dissolution): This page is about dissolving a body inside a living DAO. For the organization ending itself – the wind-down vote, the redemption, and what survives it on-chain _(updated 2026-10-09)_+ - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO mergers and token consolidations](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-mergers): Companies merge under a body of law that has spent a century deciding what happens to the shareholder who votes no: appraisal rights, a court that can price the _(updated 2026-10-11)_+ - [DAO metrics and analytics](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-metrics-and-analytics): DAO metrics are the quantitative measures used to judge whether a decentralized autonomous organization is healthy: how many members actually vote, how concentr _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO procurement and requests for proposals](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-procurement-and-rfps): A DAO that needs an audit, a market maker, a treasury manager or an RPC endpoint has to buy it. The vote that approves the spend is the visible half; the invisi _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO security and governance attacks](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-security-and-governance-attacks): A DAO governance attack is any manoeuvre that turns a decentralized organization's own decision-making machinery against it — capturing enough voting power, or  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO service providers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-service-providers): A DAO service provider is an outside firm paid by a DAO to run a defined part of its operation – indexing, treasury management, protocol engineering, growth, go _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Delegate incentive programs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/delegate-incentive-programs): A delegate incentive program is a standing budget a DAO votes to itself for the purpose of getting its own delegates to show up. It is one of the few governance _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [How DAOs fail](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/how-daos-fail): A DAO promises that a community can hold a treasury and steer a protocol without trusting a central operator. When that promise breaks, the failure is rarely th _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Scoring and review gates in DAO funding](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/scoring-and-review-gates): A review gate is the step where a DAO hands a funding decision to a small group of named people, asks them to score applications against a written rubric, and p _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [The machine-readable DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/machine-readable-dao): A DAO that nobody can read is, for most practical purposes, a private company with a public ledger. Its members exist as addresses in a contract, its decisions  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Voter apathy and governance participation](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/voter-apathy): Voter apathy is the single most durable finding in the empirical study of on-chain governance: across almost every DAO measured, the overwhelming majority of el _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Who pays to execute a passed proposal](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-execution-costs): A DAO vote that passes does not do anything. Somebody still has to send the transaction that carries the decision out, and that transaction costs money. On almo _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Cross-chain governance and multi-chain execution](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/cross-chain-governance): Cross-chain governance is what a DAO needs when the chain it votes on is not the chain it controls. The token, the governor contract and the vote live in one pl _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible — and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [History of DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/history-of-daos): The history of DAOs is barely a decade long, but it already has the arc of a much older story: a bold idea, a spectacular early disaster, a humbled rebuilding,  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [On-chain vs off-chain governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/on-chain-vs-off-chain-governance): Every DAO decision has to answer two separate questions: where do members cast their votes, and where does the winning decision actually take effect. The two ca _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Progressive decentralization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/progressive-decentralization): Progressive decentralization is the idea that a crypto protocol should not launch as a fully-formed DAO, nor stay a company forever, but move from one to the ot _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Security councils and emergency powers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/security-councils): Token voting is deliberately slow. A proposal is drafted, debated, put to a vote for several days, and then held in a timelock before it executes. That latency  _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [What is a DAO?](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/what-is-a-dao): A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a member-owned organization that runs on a blockchain: its rules, its membership, and its treasury are governed _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Autonomous agents as DAO members](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/autonomous-agent-members): An autonomous agent member is software that holds a DAO's shares under its own key and votes with them, rather than assisting a human who votes. The distinction _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-10-14)_+ - [Soulbound tokens in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/soulbound-tokens): A soulbound token is a token that, once it lands in an account, cannot be transferred or sold – it is bound to that account, or "soul." The term was popularised _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [SubDAOs, working groups & pods](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/subdaos-and-working-groups): A DAO that starts as one token holding one treasury and one voting queue eventually hits a wall: routing every hire, grant, and integration through a global tok _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-10-12)_+ - [Continuous fundraising](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/continuous-fundraising): Continuous fundraising is a way of funding a DAO in which anyone can put money in at any time, on terms a contract sets in advance, so the treasury grows with d _(updated 2026-10-13)_

Showing the first 40 of each.

version

2.4.0 → 2.5.0

https://caper.network/llms.txt

− Agents can also WRITE: launch a caper, trade its bonding curve, edit a DAO wiki, create proposals, vote on them, and trigger passed ones – with the agent's own Radix key (Stokenet testnet only, for now). Governance is two-phase: members rank ballots during the voting window (each ballot costs 100 $XRD, mints 1 soulbound vote token, and answers who pays the execution fee); a supermajority pass arms the permissionless trigger, which locks the trailing TWAP as the baseline and opens the market wind− - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation : ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholder _(updated 2026-09-26)_− - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [DAO service providers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-service-providers): A DAO service provider is an outside firm paid by a DAO to run a defined part of its operation — indexing, treasury management, protocol engineering, growth, go _(updated 2026-09-09)_− - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-09-20)_− - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-09-08)_− - [Proposal spam and the governance denominator](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-spam-and-governance-metrics): Proposal spam is what happens when a DAO's proposal surface is cheap enough to post into that people who are not participating in governance start using it as a _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Who pays to execute a passed proposal](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-execution-costs): A DAO vote that passes does not do anything. Somebody still has to send the transaction that carries the decision out, and that transaction costs money. On almo _(updated 2026-09-20)_− - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-09-18)_− - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible — and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-01)_− - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-09-28)_− - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-09-10)_− - [SubDAOs, working groups & pods](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/subdaos-and-working-groups): A DAO that starts as one token holding one treasury and one voting queue eventually hits a wall: routing every hire, grant, and integration through a global tok _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Contributor compensation in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-contributor-compensation): Contributor compensation is how a DAO pays the people who build, maintain, and govern it. It is one of the hardest operational problems a DAO faces, because a D _(updated 2026-09-07)_− - [OTC placements and market-maker loans](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/otc-placements-and-market-maker-loans): Most DAOs are rich on paper and poor in practice. The treasury holds a large block of the DAO's own governance token and very little of anything a contributor c _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [Conviction Voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/conviction-voting): Conviction voting is a continuous-funding mechanism in which a voter's influence over a proposal grows the longer they keep tokens staked behind it, and fades o _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [Optimistic governance (veto-based approval)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance): Optimistic governance flips the default of a DAO vote. In ordinary token-weighted voting a proposal starts life rejected and must gather affirmative support to  _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Price oracles in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/price-oracles-in-governance): A growing family of governance mechanisms does not count votes. Futarchy settles a proposal by comparing two conditional market prices; Caper's optimistic windo _(updated 2026-09-07)_− - [Private and shielded voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/private-and-shielded-voting): Every vote cast in a typical DAO is public the moment it lands: the address, the choice, the weight, and the running tally are all readable by anyone, live, for _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Proposal throttles and governance rate limits](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-throttles-and-rate-limits): Most DAO design attention goes to how votes are counted — quorum and threshold design , token weighting , quadratic schemes . A throttle acts one stage earlier: _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [Quorum and threshold design](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design): A quorum is the minimum amount of voting weight that must participate before a DAO proposal's result is allowed to count. A proposal threshold is the minimum we _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [The DAO tooling stack](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview): Running a DAO is not one product but a stack: a set of specialised tools, mostly independent of each other, that a community assembles to make decisions, hold m _(updated 2026-09-18)_− - [DAOstar](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/analytics/daostar): DAOstar is the standards body for decentralized autonomous organizations . It writes the technical standards and publishes the research that let DAOs, and the t _(updated 2026-09-16)_− - [Aragon](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon): Aragon is one of the oldest and most influential DAO frameworks – infrastructure for deploying an organization whose rules, membership and treasury live entirel _(updated 2026-09-19)_− - [Guild.xyz](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/guild-xyz): Guild ( guild.xyz ) is the authorization layer for token-gated communities: it decides who may enter a space and what role they hold there, based on what a wall _(updated 2026-09-12)_− - [Hats Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/hats-protocol): Hats Protocol is onchain infrastructure for roles and permissions – the layer that answers who in a DAO is allowed to do what. Most governance tooling decides w _(updated 2026-09-12)_− - [Coordinape](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape): Coordinape was the canonical tool for peer-allocated compensation in DAOs – a way to decide who gets paid without a manager, a committee, or a token vote. Inste _(updated 2026-09-24)_− - [Den (multisig operations)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/den): Den is an operations layer for organisations whose money sits in a Safe multisig. It does not custody assets and it does not deploy contracts: signing in fetche _(updated 2026-09-25)_− - [Enzyme (on-chain asset management)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/enzyme): Enzyme is an Ethereum-based protocol for decentralized, on-chain asset management: it lets anyone “set up, manage and invest in customized on-chain investment v _(updated 2026-09-12)_− - [karpatkey (kpk)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/karpatkey): karpatkey (rebranded kpk in 2025) is a non-custodial, on-chain manager for DAO treasuries. Most DAO tools answer “where does the money sit” (custody) or “how do _(updated 2026-09-12)_− - [Request Finance (invoicing, payroll & payables)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/request-finance): Request Finance is the invoicing and payables layer of a DAO treasury: the place where a contributor's claim on the treasury becomes a document — an invoice, an _(updated 2026-09-14)_− - [Safe (multisig treasury)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/safe): Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe) is the smart-contract wallet that holds the money for most of the DAO world. It is a multisignature account: instead of one private  _(updated 2026-09-13)_− - [Squads (Solana multisig & smart accounts)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/squads): Squads is the multisig and smart-account layer most Solana treasuries run on. Where Ethereum DAOs custody funds behind Safe , Solana teams reach for Squads: an  _(updated 2026-09-12)_− - [Commonwealth (the DAO forum layer)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/commonwealth): Commonwealth is the crypto-native governance forum: wallet-authenticated threads, token-gated topics, on-chain polls and a direct line into Snapshot , built for _(updated 2026-09-21)_− - [Kleros](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/voting/kleros): Kleros is a decentralized arbitration protocol on Ethereum — a general-purpose “crypto supreme court” that renders binding rulings on subjective disputes that a _(updated 2026-09-12)_+ Agents can also WRITE: launch a caper, trade its bonding curve, edit a DAO wiki, create proposals, vote on them, and trigger passed ones – with the agent's own Radix key (Stokenet testnet only, for now). Governance is two-phase: members rank ballots during the voting window (each ballot costs 100 $XRD and mints 1 soulbound vote token); a supermajority pass arms the trigger – free, and anyone can call it – which locks the trailing TWAP as the baseline and opens the market window: the winner execu+ - [The Binding Vote](https://caper.network/blog/the-binding-vote): In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means described what had happened to the American corporation : ownership and control had come apart. Thousands of shareholder _(updated 2026-10-07)_+ - [The Exit Right](https://caper.network/blog/the-exit-right): Every enduring institution has had to answer the same question: what does a member get to keep when they leave? The answer is rarely incidental. It shapes who j _(updated 2026-10-07)_+ - [The Personal Caper](https://caper.network/blog/the-personal-caper): In 1997 David Bowie did something no musician had done before: he sold his future. The banker David Pullman packaged the royalties from twenty-five albums Bowie _(updated 2026-10-07)_+ - [DAO governance operating costs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-governance-operating-costs): Ask a DAO what its governance costs to run and you will get a number. Ask two DAOs and you will get two numbers that cannot be put side by side. This is not slo _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [DAO service providers](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-service-providers): A DAO service provider is an outside firm paid by a DAO to run a defined part of its operation – indexing, treasury management, protocol engineering, growth, go _(updated 2026-10-05)_+ - [DAO tooling discontinuity](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-tooling-discontinuity): A DAO's constitution is its contracts, but its working life runs on software somebody else operates: a voting front end, a forum, a member workspace, a payments _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [EIP-4824: Common Interfaces for DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/eip-4824): EIP-4824, titled Common Interfaces for DAOs and published on Ethereum as ERC-4824, is a standard that gives any decentralized autonomous organization a single,  _(updated 2026-10-05)_+ - [Proposal spam and the governance denominator](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-spam-and-governance-metrics): Proposal spam is what happens when a DAO's proposal surface is cheap enough to post into that people who are not participating in governance start using it as a _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [Who pays to execute a passed proposal](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/proposal-execution-costs): A DAO vote that passes does not do anything. Somebody still has to send the transaction that carries the decision out, and that transaction costs money. On almo _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [Winding down a DAO](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/analysis/dao-wind-downs): A company that stops has a procedure waiting for it: a liquidator is appointed, creditors are ranked, assets are sold, the entity is struck off a register. A DA _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [DAO governance models](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/dao-governance-models): A DAO governance model is the rule that decides who holds voting power, how that power is measured, and how individual votes combine into a binding decision. It _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Governance minimization](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/governance-minimization): Governance minimization is the argument that the amount of a protocol a token vote can change should be kept as small as possible — and that for many protocols  _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Hyperstructures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/fundamentals/hyperstructures): A hyperstructure is, in Jacob Horne's 2022 definition, a crypto protocol that "can run for free and forever, without maintenance, interruption or intermediaries _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [DAO legal structures](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/dao-legal-structures): Ooki is the case everyone reaches for, and its reach is narrower than the shorthand. It was entered by default – the DAO never appeared to defend itself – and w _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Rage-quit and exit rights](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/rage-quit-and-exit-rights): Rage-quit is the right of a DAO member to leave a decision they disagree with by burning their governance stake and withdrawing a proportional share of the trea _(updated 2026-10-07)_+ - [SubDAOs, working groups & pods](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/subdaos-and-working-groups): A DAO that starts as one token holding one treasury and one voting queue eventually hits a wall: routing every hire, grant, and integration through a global tok _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Sybil resistance in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/membership/sybil-resistance-in-daos): Sybil resistance is a DAO's defence against one person secretly controlling many identities in order to swing a vote. The name comes from a 2002 paper by John D _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Contributor compensation in DAOs](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/dao-contributor-compensation): Contributor compensation is how a DAO pays the people who build, maintain, and govern it. It is one of the hardest operational problems a DAO faces, because a D _(updated 2026-10-03)_+ - [OTC placements and market-maker loans](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/treasury/otc-placements-and-market-maker-loans): Most DAOs are rich on paper and poor in practice. The treasury holds a large block of the DAO's own governance token and very little of anything a contributor c _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Conviction Voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/conviction-voting): Conviction voting is a continuous-funding mechanism in which a voter's influence over a proposal grows the longer they keep tokens staked behind it, and fades o _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Optimistic governance (veto-based approval)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/optimistic-governance): Optimistic governance flips the default of a DAO vote. In ordinary token-weighted voting a proposal starts life rejected and must gather affirmative support to  _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Price oracles in governance](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/price-oracles-in-governance): A growing family of governance mechanisms does not count votes. Futarchy settles a proposal by comparing two conditional market prices; Caper's optimistic windo _(updated 2026-10-07)_+ - [Private and shielded voting](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/private-and-shielded-voting): Every vote cast in a typical DAO is public the moment it lands: the address, the choice, the weight, and the running tally are all readable by anyone, live, for _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Proposal throttles and governance rate limits](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/proposal-throttles-and-rate-limits): Most DAO design attention goes to how votes are counted — quorum and threshold design , token weighting , quadratic schemes . A throttle acts one stage earlier: _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [Quorum and threshold design](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/concepts/voting/quorum-and-threshold-design): A quorum is the minimum amount of voting weight that must participate before a DAO proposal's result is allowed to count. A proposal threshold is the minimum we _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [The DAO tooling stack](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/dao-tooling-overview): Running a DAO is not one product but a stack: a set of specialised tools, mostly independent of each other, that a community assembles to make decisions, hold m _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [DAOstar](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/analytics/daostar): DAOstar is the standards body for decentralized autonomous organizations . It writes the technical standards and publishes the research that let DAOs, and the t _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Aragon](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/aragon): Aragon is one of the oldest and most influential DAO frameworks – infrastructure for deploying an organization whose rules, membership and treasury live entirel _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Gardens (conviction voting)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/gardens): Gardens is a governance framework for spending a shared treasury by conviction voting : members stake their voting weight behind proposals, that support grows s _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Nouns Builder](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/frameworks/nouns-builder): Nouns Builder is a no-code kit for launching a DAO on the Nouns DAO model. One transaction to its Manager contract deploys five linked contracts: an ERC-721 tok _(updated 2026-10-04)_+ - [Guild.xyz](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/guild-xyz): Guild ( guild.xyz ) is the authorization layer for token-gated communities: it decides who may enter a space and what role they hold there, based on what a wall _(updated 2026-10-01)_+ - [Hats Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/hats-protocol): Hats Protocol is onchain infrastructure for roles and permissions – the layer that answers who in a DAO is allowed to do what. Most governance tooling decides w _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Unlock Protocol](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/membership/unlock-protocol): Unlock Protocol is a set of smart contracts for memberships. Anyone can deploy a lock, a contract that sells or grants keys, and each key is an ERC-721 NFT that _(updated 2026-10-05)_+ - [Coordinape](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/coordinape): Coordinape was the canonical tool for peer-allocated compensation in DAOs – a way to decide who gets paid without a manager, a committee, or a token vote. Inste _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Den (multisig operations)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/den): Den is an operations layer for organisations whose money sits in a Safe multisig. It does not custody assets and it does not deploy contracts: signing in fetche _(updated 2026-10-06)_+ - [Enzyme (on-chain asset management)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/enzyme): Enzyme is an Ethereum-based protocol for decentralized, on-chain asset management: it lets anyone “set up, manage and invest in customized on-chain investment v _(updated 2026-10-03)_+ - [Hedgey (token vesting and lockups)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/hedgey): Hedgey is a set of token-distribution contracts and a free app that DAOs and token issuers use to lock tokens and release them on a schedule: vesting for contri _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [karpatkey (kpk)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/karpatkey): karpatkey (rebranded kpk in 2025) is a non-custodial, on-chain manager for DAO treasuries. Most DAO tools answer “where does the money sit” (custody) or “how do _(updated 2026-10-02)_+ - [Questbook (grants management)](https://caper.network/wiki/dao-governance/tooling/treasury/questbook): Questbook ( questbook.app ) is a hosted application for running a grant programme from application to payout. Builders apply with milestones and amounts set out _(updated 2026-10-02)_

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